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responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or 
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authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or 
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product 
endorsement purposes. 
 
 
 
This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. 
 

B239 Implementation Validation Review 
Page 2 of 5  1/15/2010 
 
1. Introduction / Background 
The purpose of this task was to perform an Independent Validation Review to evaluate the 
successful implementation and effectiveness of Safety Basis controls, including new and revised 
controls, to support the implementation of a new DSA/TSR for B239. This task addresses 
Milestone 2 of FY10 PEP 7.6.6. As the first IVR ever conducted on a LLNL nuclear facility, it was 
designated a pilot project. 
The review follows the outline developed for Milestone 1 of the PEP, which is based on the DOE 
Draft Guide for Performance of Independent Verification Review of Safety Basis Controls. A 
formal Safety Basis procedure will be developed later, based on the lessons learned with this 
pilot project. Note, this review is termed a “Validation” in order to be consistent with the PEP 
definition and address issues historically raised about verification mechanisms at LLNL. 
Validation is intended to confirm that implementing mechanisms realistically establish the 
ability of TSR LCO, administrative control or safety management program to accomplish its 
intended safety function and that the controls are being implemented. This effort should not, 
however, be confused with a compliance assessment against all relevant DOE requirements and 
national standards. Nor is it used as a vehicle to question the derivation of controls already 
approved by LSO unless a given TSR statement simply cannot be implemented as stated. 
2. Scope of the IVR 
This IVR is considered to be an initial baseline review conducted immediately following the 
implementation of a new DSA/TSR. As a baseline review, the controls specifically described in 
the TSR for B239 are validated. The procedure to be developed will specify a graded approach, 
and future IVRs may be limited to only those controls that changed from this baseline with 
periodic reverifications.  
This IVR includes the following Specific Administrative Controls: 
 Facility Radioactive and Hazardous Material Limits 
 High Explosives Limit 
 Criticality Safety Evaluations 
 Facility Allowable Forms 
 Waste Drum Requirements 
 Combustible Loading Limit 
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This IVR includes the following Safety Management Programs: 
 Radiation Protection 
 Criticality Safety 
 Unreviewed Safety Question Process 
 Configuration Management 
 Fire Protection 
 Emergency Preparedness 
 Maintenance 
 Quality Assurance 
 Occurrence Reporting 
 Accountability, Control, and Handling of Materials 
 Hazardous Material Safety 
The Safety Management Program review also includes a verification of the implementation of 
Procedures, Minimum Staffing, and Recordkeeping. 
The extent of review of the Safety Management Programs determines whether the Programs 
are being implemented in B239 but does not perform a detailed review of each Program. 
There are no Safety Limits, no Limiting Conditions for Operations, no Surveillance 
Requirements, no Safety Significant SSCs, and no Design Features to be reviewed.  
3. IVR Preparations 
The IVR team received direction from the Safety Basis Division Leader, who worked technical 
and administrative issues with the Facility Manager. The following comprised the B239 IVR 
Team: 
 Tom Altenbach – Team Leader 
 Howard Wong 
 Jim Watson 
 Ron Beaulieu 
All team members have extensive facility safety experience, and no additional training was 
necessary to undertake this IVR. The Team was substantially independent of the development 
of the DSA/TSR, although some did perform in an institutional review capacity before the 
submittal of the completed documentation. In preparing for this IVR, all Team members 
reviewed the new B239 TSR. 
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4. Review Process 
The IVR used a simple Criteria and Review Approach Document (CRAD) approach. The CRADs 
used are listed in the attached Form 1. Team meetings were held daily to facilitate 
communication and review progress. The status of the IVR was regularly communicated to the 
Facility Manager. Most of the review approaches were based on document review and 
interviews, with limited direct observation of activities. 
5. Basis for Results Presentation 
There is no institutional guidance specific to an IVR. Accordingly, a two-tier finding 
categorization is used in this pilot effort. The first tier consists of TSR Implementation 
Deficiencies. The second, less serious tier, consists of Deficiencies and Observations, the 
standard issues defined in LLNL institutional procedure PRO 0042 00, Issues and Corrective 
Action Management (June 1, 2009). Accordingly, all findings are identified by one of the 
following three terms: 
 A TSR Implementation Deficiency is defined as: 
A condition, event, procedure, or practice that indicates a TSR, whether LCO, SAC, or 
safety management program, is not successfully implemented. 
 
A Deficiency is defined as: 
A condition, event, procedure, or operation that is not in compliance with the 
requirements of applicable federal, state, and/or local laws and regulations, the LLNS 
Contract, or the LLNL-specific implementing procedures/manuals. 
 
An Observation is defined as: 
A compliant condition, event, operation, or practice that warrants action tracking or is 
included for trending purposes to identify future potential areas for improvement. 
6. Results 
No TSR Implementation Deficiencies were identified. The IVR Team found that all relevant 
criteria in the Controls and Training areas were met. Two simple Deficiencies and four 
Observations were identified. Neither Deficiency rose to a level that would constitute a TSR 
Implementation Deficiency.  
 Table 1 below provides a list of Deficiencies and Observations. Details of the review are 
included in the attached Form 1. The Deficiencies and Observations are listed in the order that 
they appear in the Form 1 text. Other opportunities for improvement, some of which are 
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beyond the scope of the IVR, are noted in the Form 1 text to support continuous improvement 
in nuclear operations. 
Table 1. List of Deficiencies and Observations  
Controls Functional Area 
General  
1) Observation: The Facility Safety Plan (FSP) references should be updated to reflect the 
revised safety basis date of September 2008 and the correct title of the Superblock Work 
Control Manual (WCM). 
Waste Drum Requirements 
2) Observation: There should be a clarification as to what Department of Transportation 
specification is to be met. 
Radiation Protection 
3) Deficiency: The requirements of the Health Physics Discipline Action Plan for submitting the 
air filters for counting were not followed. This is not considered significant enough to fail 
the overall objectives of the Radiation Protection Program or the Controls Functional Area. 
Emergency Preparedness 
4) Observation: There should be a mechanism established that notifies those responsible for 
maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Hazard Assessment whenever changes to the 
material at risk in a nuclear facility are authorized. This would allow for a summary 
determination as to whether a major change to emergency classification or response has 
potentially been created.  
Quality Assurance 
5) Observation: The expired FMP-0207 should be formally extended while the revision process 
continues. 
Training Functional Area 
6) Deficiency: At least one B239 worker in a significant position has not completed all 
necessary training. The minimum core personnel needed to declare implementation should 
be defined. The minimum training requirements for those personnel, including safety basis 
and relevant safety management program training, should be defined. 
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Functional Area: Objective: Date: Objective Met: 
Controls 1 1/15/10 
 
     Yes 
 
     No 
Objective 1 
Verity that the TSR safety basis controls and requirements are incorporated in appropriate 
facility documents and work instructions. 
Criterion: 1.1 
Verify that facility implementation documentation identifies specific implementing procedures 
or program mechanisms for each control. 
Review Approach: Obtain the final facility implementation documentation and review against 
the approved TSRs. Evaluate these results against those from Criteria 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5. 
Criterion: 1.2 
Validate that there is clear linkage from the TSR and its safety function to the SAC implementing 
procedures. Specifically, validate that the control and all relevant details necessary to 
understand its application are accurately cited in the implementing procedure. 
Review Approach: Evaluate the content of the cited procedures. Are they complete and 
accurate? Do they leave any issues open to interpretation? 
Where specific parameters such as time or quantities are cited, are there other governing 
procedures or forms that should cite the SAC as well? If so, they should be complete and 
accurate as well. 
Where controls are only applicable at certain times or during certain operations, is that clearly 
specified and trackable during operations to the degree necessary? 
Criterion: 1.3 
Validate that changes to SAC procedures are controlled and only the current approved versions 
of SAC procedures are used. 
Review Approach: Is there a defined mechanism for review and approval of procedure 
changes? 
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Does a spot check of the procedures available to operators in the facility find only the current 
versions cited in implementation? 
Criterion: 1.4 
Validate that any SAC procedures that require periodic performance of activities to support the 
SAC (e.g., measurements, combustible loading verification) have successful completion 
documented. 
Review Approach: Sample documentation associated with performance of the implementing 
procedure for each SAC. Does the documentation demonstrate completion of the procedure 
accurately and on the frequency specified? Tour the facility to assure that actual facility 
conditions meet SAC requirements. 
Criterion: 1.5 
Validate that a documented implementing mechanism, institutional or facility-specific, exists 
for each TSR safety management program. 
Review Approach: This is not a compliance review against all DOE requirements. This validation 
is intended to determine that cited programs exist with sufficient detail and definition to insure 
the cited capability is reliable and consistent. The expected outcome is identification of either a 
current facility-specific manual /procedure integrated into facility operations or an institutional 
capability with a current implementing interface with the facility. 
Criterion: 1.6 
Validate that there is clear specification of the key elements of each TSR safety management 
program in implementing procedures. Specifically, validate that the key element and all 
relevant details necessary to understand its application are accurately cited in the 
implementing procedure.  
Review Approach: Evaluate the content of the cited procedures. Are they complete and 
accurate? Do they leave any issues open to interpretation? 
Where specific parameter such as time or quantities are cited, are there other governing 
procedures or forms that should cite the SAC as well? If so, they should be complete and 
accurate as well.  
Where controls are only applicable at certain times or during certain operations, is that clearly 
specified and trackable during operation to the degree necessary? 
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Documents and Records Reviewed 
1. Radiography Facility - Building 239 Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), September 2008. 
2. Radiography Facility - Building 239 Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), September 
2008. 
3. Letter, A. Williams to B. Goodwin, Approval of the  Annual Update of the Documented 
Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements for the Building 239 Radiography 
Facility (TS:090061), September 11, 2009, COR-NSI-9/9/2009-132640. 
4. Implementation Guide for Developing Technical Safety Requirements, DOE-G 423.1-1, 
October 24, 2001. 
5. Guide for Performance of Independent Verification Review of Safety Basis Controls, DOE 
Draft Guide for Pilot Testing and Comment, 2009. 
6. Safety Basis Implementation Procedure for Hazard Category 2 and 3 Nuclear Facilities 
Revision 1, LLNL Safety Basis Division Procedure AB-011, July 1, 2009. 
7. Radiography Facility – Building 239 Facility Safety Plan, December 2009. 
8. Building 239 – Radiography Facility TSR Implementation Plan Revision1, October 2009. 
9. B239 Implementation Verification Matrix of September 2008 DSA/ TSR, December 10, 
2009. 
10. Building 239 Flammable/Combustible Materials Control Procedure, ECMS No: CMU07-
000321 Rev. AB, Alternate No: ACP-B239-001, December 8, 2009. 
11. Interdepartmental Memorandum RF09-003, J. Sloan to R. Rocha, B239 DSA/TSR Annual 
Update Implementation, December 10, 2009. 
12. ES&H Manual Document 41.1, LLNL Quality Assurance Program, issued September 18, 
2009. 
13. Weapons and Complex Integration, Nuclear Materials Technology Program, Quality 
Assurance Program, NMTP-QAP-06-001, Revision 1, April 2008, ECMS No: NMU07-
000003-Rev AB. 
14. Preparation, Review and Approval of NMTP Facilities Procedures, ECMS No: CMU06-
000089 Rev. AC, Alternate No: NMTP-FMP-0100, October 22, 2008. 
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15. Tracking Procedures and Controlled Documents, ECMS No: CMU06-000090 Rev. AB, 
Alternate No: NMTP-FMP-0101, January 17, 2007. 
16. ECMS Document Control Procedure, ECMS No. CMU06-000010 Rev. AA, Alternate No: 
NMTP-FMP-0207, May 17, 2006. (This document is expired. It is being revised, but no 
extension memo has been processed yet.) 
17. Procurement/Acceptance Process for NMTP Superblock (Nuclear Materials Technology 
Program) Quality-Significant Orders, ECMS No: CMU06-000099 Rev AB, Alternate No: 
NMTP-FMP-0500, May 15, 2008. 
18. Recordkeeping System for NMTP Facilities, ECMS No: CMU07-000112, Rev AA, Alternate 
No: NMTP-FMP-0700, June 8, 2007. 
19. Calibration Program for NMTP Facilities Critical Measuring and Test Equipment, ECMS 
NO: CMU06-000101 Rev. AB, Alternate No: NMTP-FMP-0701, September 24, 2009. 
20. NMTP Feedback and Improvement Plan, UCRL-AR-137587-REV-1. (This has been 
superseded by REV-2 from August 2007.) 
21. Superblock Work Control Manual, ECMS No: CMU08-000033 Rev AA, LLNL-AR-409585, 
December 2008. 
22. Facilities Responses and Events, ECMS No: CMU06-000169 Re. AA, Alternate No: NMTP-
FMP-0400, December 18, 2006.  
23. Occurrence Critiques, ECMS No: CMU07-000058, Rev. AD, Alternate No: NMTP-FMP-
0800, January 21, 2009. 
24. LLNL Implementation Procedure for Reporting Occurrences to DOE, ES&H Manual 
Document 4.3, approved July 30, 2009. 
25. Events: Notification, Analysis, and Reporting, ES&H Manual Document 4.5, approved 
January 5, 2009. 
26. Incident Analysis Manual, ES&H Manual Document 4.6, minor revision November 4, 
2008. 
27. Building 239 Technical Safety Requirement Violation, Occurrence Report NA—LSO-LLNL-
LLNL-2008-0071, February 20, 2009. 
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28. Transportation Safety Document, UCRL-MA-152462-REV-2, June 2007. 
29. 49 CFR 178.350, Specification 7A; General Packaging, Type A, Department of 
Transportation, Washington DC. 
30. Surveillance Requirement Procedure SRP-B239-4.2.1, Semiannually, Warning Lights 
Inspection Verifying Actuation by RAMS, ECMS No: CMU08-000097 Rev. AA, Alternate 
No: SRP-B239-4.2.1, May 14, 2008. 
31. Surveillance Requirement Procedure SRP-B239-4.2.2, Annual, RAMS Test and 
Recalibration, ECMS No: CMU08-000098 Rev. AA, Alternate No: SRP-B239-4.2.2, May 14, 
2008. 
32. Maintenance Implementation Plan for Superblock Hazard Category 2 & 3 Nuclear 
Facilities, ECMS No: CMU09-000021 Rev. AA, Alternate No: LLNL-AM-410362, August 29, 
2008. 
33. Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Process, ECMS No: CMU06-000100 Rev AF, Alternate 
No: NMTP-FMP-0600, October 19, 2009. 
34. Facility Safety Plans and Integration Work Sheets with Safety Plans, ES&H Manual 
Document 3.3, May 20, 2008. 
35. OSP Development and Implementation Guide, ECMS No: CMU07-000132, Rev AB, 
Alternate No: NMTP-FMP-0102, July 2, 2008. 
36. NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan, ECMS No: NMU08-000015 AB, 
October 22, 2008 
37. Superblock Configuration Management Plan for VSS, ECMS No: CMU06-000021 AB, 
October 9, 2009. 
38. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Emergency Plan January 2007, UCRL-AM-
227423, January 2007. 
39. Building 239 Facility-Specific Emergency Plan, August 2006. 
40. Building 239 Facility-Specific Emergency Plan, Draft, January 2010. 
41. Emergency Preparedness Hazards Assessment, Building 239 Radiography Facility, Rev. 2, 
May 2007. 
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42.  EALS for Building 239, July 24, 2007. 
43. ES&H Manual Document 22.1, Emergency Preparedness and Response, issued May 2, 
2009. 
44. Zone 9 Self-Help Plan, November 8, 2006 and quarterly updates. 
45. ES&H Manual Document 21.1, Acquisition, Receipt, Transportation, and Tracking of 
Hazardous Materials, issued March 4, 2009. 
46. ES&H Manual Document 21.2, Transportation Safety Manual Volume 1: Main Site – Site 
200, issued July 6, 2009. 
47. ES&H Manual Document 22.5, Fire, issued December 27, 2007. 
48. Fire Hazards Analysis Building 239, August 25, 2008. 
49. Discipline Action Plan Fire Protection, Building 239 – 2009, Rev. 7.3, December 2008. 
50. 4th Qtr 2009 239 Fuel Loading, Excel spreadsheet, Michael L. Jones, December 2009.  
51. ES&H Manual Document 10.2, LLNL Health Hazard Communications Program, issued 
December 10, 2007. 
52. ES&H Manual Document 14.1, LLNL Chemical Safety Management Program, issued 
December 12, 2007. 
53. Industrial Hygiene Discipline Action Plan for Building 239, 2009 Version. 
54. Material Safety Data Sheet, DowthermA, October 1980. 
55. Operational Safety Plan (OSP) S-003, Transfer of Radioactive Material Among Superblock 
Facilities, September 30, 2008. 
56. MM-OG-172, Checklist for Onsite Movement of Radioactive Material.  
57. ChemTrack web site. http://chemtrack.llnl.gov/chemtrack/index.html 
58. Weapon and Complex Integration Directorate B239 Training Manual, ECMS No: CMU08-
000167 Rev AB, November 2008. 
 
59. B239 Operations Logbook. 
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60. ES&H Manual Document 51.3, LLNL Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Process, Rev. 8. 
61. List of Superblock documents to which the USQ process is applicable, KLFsjb-1357 
revision 0 (10/16/09). 
62. NMTP USQ Compliance List, October 2009 (rev 12/16/09). 
63. 2009 USQ Assessment Report in Preparation for CDNS Review, April 22, 2009. 
64. List of Unreviewed Safety Question Determinations/Screenings for Bldg. 239 (printed on 
12/16/09). 
65. B239 FSP/DSA/TSR Training Update (12/16/09). 
66. USQD , B239-09-050-D, rev. 0, Baseline Evaluation of the Radiography Facility – B239 
Criticality Control Review Document, Revision 1 (CCR-B239-NCSD-2009-001). 
67. USQS, B239-09-043-S, Rev 0, Operating Procedures, Preparation of SNM for Transport 
from Bldg 239, SNM Pit Handling in Building 239, and Preparation for JTA Handling in 
Bldg 239. 
68. USQD, B239-09-027-D, Rev. 0, Baseline Review of the ES&H Team 1 Health Physics 
Discipline Action Plan for Building 239. 
69. USQD- B239-08-058-D, Rev. 0, Installation and Pre-Operational Testing of the Linatron 
M9A X-ray System in Room B11. 
70. NMTP AB Issues Meeting Minutes 
 March 4, 2009 
 March 11, 2009 
 June 3, 2009 
 June 24, 2009 
 November 4, 2009 
 December 9, 2009 
71. CSAM-08-147 (11/18/08). 
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72. CSM 1347, Addendum 1 (11/18/08). 
73. Record of Independent Review (for CSAM-08-147 and CSM 1347) signed by D. Heinrichs. 
74. CSAM -09-126 (10/21/09). 
75. CSM 1527 (7/17/08). 
76. CSAM 09-020, Rev. 1 (6/12/09). 
77. CSM 1548, Rev. 1 (6/12/09). 
78. Criticality Safety Discipline Action Plan (DAP) (6/10/09). 
79. ES&H Manual Document 20.3, LLNL Radiological Safety Program for Radiation 
Generating Devices, Revision 3. 
80. ES&H Team 1 Health Physics Discipline Action Plan for Building 239, Revision 7.5 
(5/27/09). 
81. B239 Work Permits 
 239-09-D-003 (closed) 
 239-09-D-008 (closed) 
 239-09-D-009 (closed) 
 239-09-D-016 (closed) 
 239-09-D-001 (open) 
 239-09-D-004 (open) 
82. SRP-B239-4.1.1/4.1.2/4.1.3, Surveillance Requirement Procedure Semiannually, 
Inspection and Testing to Ensure Operability of the Interlock System – SR 4.1.1, Daisy 
Chain Key-Actuated Interlock System, SR 4.1.2, Interlock Switches and Gates, and SR 
4.1.3, Emergency Shutdown Buttons, Rev. AB. 
83. Attachment 1 to SRP-B239-4.1.1/4.1.2/4.1.3, Rev AB, completed on 8/12/09. 
84. Attachment 1 to SRP-B239-4.2.1, Rev. AA, completed on 8/11/09. 
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85. Attachment 1 to SRP-B239-4.2.2, Rev AA completed on 1/26/09. 
86. System Design Description, Building 239 System Design Description for the Daisy Chain 
Key-Actuated Interlock System (draft). 
87.       Facility worker required reading documentation for ACP-B239-001, dated 12/9/2009. 
88.       Nuclear Materials Technology Program Configuration Management Management Self-
Assessment Report, November 12, 2009. 
89.       B239 Training Implementation Matrix (TIM), December 2006, UCRL-AM-205022. 
90.       Letter, A. Williams to B. Goodwin, COR-OM-11/24/2008, Approval of Training 
Implementation Matrices for B239 and B334. 
91.       B239 FSP/DSA/TSR Training Updates Sign-in Sheets, December 9, 2009, December 16, 
2009, and January 5, 2010. 
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Interviews Conducted 
1. Jim Sloan, Facility Manager (and Minimum Staffing POC) 
2. Annie Warner, Deputy Facility Manager 
3. Glen Held, B239 Facility Safety Officer 
4. Robert Lochner, FPOC 
5. Randall Thompson, Alternate FPOC 
6. Kjell Tengsdal, Lead Health Physicist for B239 (Radiation Protection POC) 
7. John Pearson, Criticality Safety Lead for Superblock Facilities 
8. Stephanie Bates, NMTP Deputy Authorization Basis Manager/Lead Safety Analyst for 
B239 (Unreviewed Safety Question POC) 
9. Michael L. Jones, Fire Protection POC 
10. Debbie LaPierre, Emergency Preparedness POC 
11. Dwight Squire, NMTP Facilities Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering Manager  
12. Mark McCuller, B239 System Engineer 
13. Bob Swift, Quality Assurance POC 
14. Donna Mailhot, NMTP Assurance Manager (Occurrence Reporting POC) 
15. Kevin Mahoney, Material Control and Accounting POC 
16. Jim Boyer, Hazardous Materials Safety POC 
17. Lorenzo Wells, NMTP Training Manager 
18.        Don Kavanagh, NMTP Material Handler 
19.        Willie Mitchell, NMTP Trainer 
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Evolutions Performed and Observed 
1. A Walk down of B239 was performed on December 15, 2009. It was lead by the Facility 
Manager and attended by all four members of the IVR Team. The Facility Safety Officer 
and Alternate FPOC were also available to answer questions at that time. 
2. The Radiography Facility DSA/TSR/FSP Supplemental Training Presentation, December 
16, 2009 was observed. 
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Discussion of Results 
Specific Administrative Controls  
(Note Criteria 1.5 and 1.6 are not applicable) 
Facility Radioactive and Hazardous Material Limits 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that the Facility Radioactive and Hazardous Material 
Limits concerning Pu-239 equivalent, highly enriched uranium, depleted uranium, lithium 
hydride, beryllium and beryllium oxide are effectively implemented. 
Criterion 1.1 
The Facility Radioactive and Hazardous Material Limits were implemented in the following 
document: 
 Facility Safety Plan (see Table 3-2. Directive Action Specific Administrative Controls and 
Appendix F, Administrative Controls Checklist.) 
Criterion 1.2 
The control and all relevant details necessary to understand its application are accurately cited 
in the implementing procedure. 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to radioactive and hazardous 
material transfers into and out of Building 239. 
Criterion 1.3 
The Facility Safety Plan is controlled. The users of the procedure are responsible to use the 
current approved version of the procedure. 
Criterion 1.4 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to radioactive and hazardous 
material transfers into Building 239. The results are recorded in the Facility Safety Plan, 
Appendix F, Administrative Controls Checklist. 
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High Explosives Limit 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that the High Explosives Limit of 10 grams is effectively 
implemented. 
Criterion 1.1 
The High Explosives Limit was implemented in the following document: 
 Facility Safety Plan (see Table 3-2. Directive Action Specific Administrative Controls and 
Appendix F, Administrative Controls Checklist.) 
Criterion 1.2 
The control and all relevant details necessary to understand its application are accurately cited 
in the implementing procedure. 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to high explosives transfers into 
Building 239. 
Criterion 1.3 
The Facility Safety Plan is controlled. The users of the procedure are responsible to use the 
current approved version of the procedure. 
Criterion 1.4 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to high explosives transfers into 
Building 239. The results are recorded in the Facility Safety Plan, Appendix F, Administrative 
Controls Checklist. 
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Criticality Safety Evaluations  
Criterion 1.1 
The B239 Criticality Safety Program flows down from the following documents: 
 LLNL ES&H Manual Document 20.6, Criticality Safety 
 B239 DSA Chapter 6, Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality 
 B239 TSR Table 5-2, Directive Action Specific Administrative Controls 
 B239 Facility Safety Plan  
 Nuclear Criticality Safety Division Discipline Action Plan (DAP) for NMTP Facilities (Except 
RHWM), dated 6/10/09.   
Criterion 1.2 
The purpose of the Criticality Safety Program is to assure criticality safety through engineered 
and administrative controls for fissionable materials, procedures for packaging materials, 
review and approval process for operations/activities, and a formal training program.  The B239 
DSA/TSR specify the engineered and administrative controls needed for safe operations.  The 
B239 FSP was found to accurately reflect the criticality safety controls specified in the DSA/TSR, 
including the TSR Specific Administrative Control that operations involving greater than 145 
grams of fissionable materials be evaluated and documented in a criticality safety evaluation 
(Criticality Safety Memorandum).   
The criticality safety evaluation process is initiated through provisions in Section 3.3.3.2 of the 
B239 FSP and through the B239 Criticality Safety Review and Approval form (Appendix E of the 
B239 FSP).  If the proposed operation/activity is considered to be with “insignificant quantities 
of fissionable materials”, the Facility Manager may approve the Review and Approval form.  For 
operations/activities with “significant quantities of fissionable material”, the Review and 
Approval form must be signed by a representative from the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division 
and the Facility Manager.  Supporting the Review and Approval form are the Criticality Safety 
Administrative Memorandum (CSAM) and Criticality Safety Memorandum (CSM) documents.  A 
sample of Review and Approval forms and the associated CSAM and CSM documents were 
reviewed.  The documents were found to be sufficiently detailed, technically supported the 
conclusions, and clearly specified the required criticality safety controls needed for the 
proposed operation/activity.  The threshold for completing a CSAM and CSM are low as 
evidenced by a CSAM and CSM which evaluated a radiography operation that was like a 
previous operation with the only change being that the item would be double bagged.  This 
minor change in the process was evaluated in a new CSAM and CSM.  The CSAM and CSM 
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documents are reviewed at a minimum by the Criticality Safety Division Leader and the review 
is documented on a Record of Independent Review form. 
A new criticality safety document has been prepared to meet DOE O 420.1B, that is the 
Radiography Facility B239 Criticality Control Review Document (Rev. 1). This document is 
intended to provide “a documented analysis to support the linkage and selection of the 
criticality safety controls in the B239 DSA/TSR.”  This document also provides a checklist 
process to identify any future CSMs, which may create new controls, for evaluation of whether 
they should be added to the B239 TSR.  This document has been submitted to NNSA/LSO for 
review and approval. 
The criticality safety training as documented in LTRAIN for the Facility Manager, Deputy Facility 
Manager, Facility Safety Officer, and 2 radiographers was reviewed and all personnel were 
found to be current on the required criticality safety training. 
Criterion 1.3 
The Criticality Safety program implementing documents are the B239 FSP and Criticality Safety 
DAP.  Both documents are controlled documents and current versions were available to B239 
staff. 
Criterion 1.4 
The documents reviewed confirmed that the B239 Criticality Safety Program is being 
implemented and personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements. 
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Facility Allowable Forms 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that the SAC on Allowable Forms of SNM in B239 is 
effectively implemented. 
Criterion 1.1 
The Facility Allowable Forms were implemented in the following document: 
 Facility Safety Plan (see Table 3-2. Directive Action Specific Administrative Controls and 
Appendix F, Administrative Controls Checklist.) 
Criterion 1.2 
The control and all relevant details necessary to understand its application are accurately cited 
in the implementing procedure. 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to radioactive and hazardous 
material transfers into Building 239. 
Criterion 1.3 
The Facility Safety Plan is controlled. The users of the procedure are responsible to use the 
current approved version of the procedure. 
Criterion 1.4 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to radioactive and hazardous 
material transfers into Building 239. The results are recorded in the Facility Safety Plan, 
Appendix F, Administrative Controls Checklist. 
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Waste Drum Requirements 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that waste drums containing TRU waste are sealed 
containers that meet DOT specification. 
Criterion 1.1 
The implementing mechanism listed in the TSR Implementation Plan (Ref. 8) is the FSP (Ref. 7), 
in particular Section 3.4.1 Waste Handling which states:  
 “Prior to transfer to Building 239, waste drums containing SNM shall be inspected for 
evidence of container damage or overpressurization and for compliance with DOT 
specification and applicable DOE requirements. Acceptance by the Building 239 Facility 
Manager, Facility Point of Contact, or designee of the appropriate Transportation Safety 
Document (TSD) paperwork satisfies this requirement. “ 
In addition, the FSP Appendix F contains the Administrative Controls Checklist that must be 
included in the work package for bringing any hazardous or radioactive materials identified in 
Table 3-2 in B239. In the checklist, the FPOC, Safety Officer, or Facility Manager must verify by 
initials that the activity does not result in violating the administrative control for waste drum 
requirements. 
Criterion 1.2 
There is clear linkage from the TSR and its safety function to the FSP that implements the SAC. 
However the relevant details necessary to understand its application, such as what “DOT 
specification” applies, are not provided. If a more general citation of multiple specifications is 
intended, revision of the TSR may be appropriate.  
Since reliance is placed upon the “appropriate Transportation Safety Document paperwork” to 
implement this SAC, the Transportation Safety Document (TSD, Ref. 28) should also be 
considered an implementing document. From the TSD, it appears the DOT specification being 
referred to is 49 CFR 178.350, Specification 7A, General Packaging, Type A (Ref.29). 
Criterion 1.3 
The FSP is a controlled document in ECMS. It was updated as part of the B239 TSR 
implementation, and only the current version is in use. 
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Criterion 1.4 
The control is applicable at all times and is administered prior to waste drum material transfers 
into Building 239. The results are recorded in the Facility Safety Plan, Appendix F, 
Administrative Controls Checklist. There are no SAC procedures that require periodic 
performance of activities to support the Waste Drum Requirements SAC.  
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Combustible Loading Limit 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that the Combustible Loading Limit of 2 lb/ft2 is 
effectively implemented. 
Criterion 1.1 
The Combustible Loading Limit was implemented in the following documents: 
 ACP-B239-01 
 Facility Safety Plan 
Criterion 1.2 
The control and all relevant details necessary to understand its application are accurately cited 
in the implementing procedure. 
The control is applicable when SNM is present in Building 239 and is administered during 
periodic walkthroughs and prior to SNM transfers into Building 239 or when significant 
quantities of combustible materials are brought into Building 239. 
Criterion 1.3 
Procedures ACP-B239-01 and the Facility Safety Plan are controlled. The users of the 
procedures are responsible to use the current approved version of the procedure. 
Criterion 1.4 
The Fire Protection Engineer documents the results (i.e., successful completion of the SAC) via 
ACP-B239-01 using an Excel spreadsheet developed by the Fire Protection Engineer who 
maintains these records.  The Fire Protection Engineer sends specific emails to the Facility 
Manager and others with a compliance notification. The results are also recorded in the Facility 
Safety Plan, Appendix F, Administrative Controls Checklist. Since the Checklist is prepared 
before SNM is brought into the Facility, it is not relevant to check off on the 4-ft radius 
separation between a plutonium component and combustible material. Documentation 
associated with performance of the implementation of this requirement is contained on 
specific work permits.  
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Safety Management Programs 
(Note Criteria 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 are not applicable.) 
Radiation Protection  
Criterion 1.1 
The B239 Radiation Protection Program is principally defined and implemented through the 
following documents: 
 B239 FSP 
 B239 Health Physics Discipline Action Plan (DAP) 
 LLNL ES&H Manual Documents 20.1, Occupational Radiation Protection, and 20.3, LLNL 
Radiological Safety Program for Radiation Generating Devices 
 Superblock Work Control Manual 
Criterion 1.5 
The B239 TSR describes the key elements of the Radiation Protection Program and includes: 
 ALARA principle 
 Dosimetry program 
 Radiation safety training 
 Radiation-generating devices (RGDs)  operated in compliance with the provisions of 
LLNL ES&H Manual Document 20.3, LLNL Radiological Safety Program for Radiation 
Generating Devices 
 Monitoring system and procedures, specifically including access control 
 RGD shielding and shield walls maintained in compliance with the provisions of 
Document 20.3 and assessment of any alterations. 
These TSR key elements are implemented through the B239 FSP, Section 3.3.3.1, and through 
the B239 Health Physics DAP. 
Criterion 1.6 
The B239 FSP and Health Physics DAP were found to be consistent with the provisions in ES&H 
Manual Document 20.3.  The Lead Health Physicist evaluates proposed operations/activities in 
B239 through the Work Permit review process.  The Health Physicist formally reviews and 
approves the proposed operation/activity and documents this on the work permit form.  The 
Health Physicist reviews the proposed activity for any unique or special circumstances requiring 
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specific controls, the expected dose rates from the activity, the need for any special surveys or 
monitoring, locations of CAMs, and evaluation of the need for personnel pre-job briefings.  It is 
through this review process that controls are identified and specified.  When fissionable 
materials are brought into B239 and after removal from the packaging, the container is swiped 
to assure that contamination is not present.  Continuous air monitoring is required by the FSP 
when singly contained Special Nuclear Material is out of its shipping container and the RGD is 
not operating.  These measures implement the ALARA principle. 
The B239 ALARA and dosimetry program includes the review of external dosimetry data from 
the Hazards Control Department and notification of appropriate managers when a radiation 
dose to a worker in a Superblock facility is identified.  This review is routinely performed 
approximately on a monthly basis.  Several records of this review were observed and 
demonstrated a detailed review of the dose as compared to administrative limits.   
Access to the radiography bays when preparing for radiographic operations is strictly controlled 
though the use of a passageway keyed-interlock system, physical sweeps of areas, PA 
announcements, warning lights, and radiation monitors.  Emergency stop buttons are installed 
in various locations should personnel be present in hazardous locations with radiographic 
operations taking place or about to take place.  Some of these provisions were previously 
identified to be safety significant features, but are now equipment important to safety that are 
being maintained and tested as was done previously. As equipment important to safety, these 
systems including the shield walls are covered under the USQ process and any proposed 
changes to these systems or associated procedures would require a USQ review to assure the 
facility safety basis is maintained. 
Radiation survey records while the 9/5 MeV RGD was operating were reviewed and indicated 
very low levels of radiation in occupied areas outside the RGD high bays.   These surveys include 
the initial survey performed on 1/29/09 and the semi-annual surveys performed in 7/9/09 and 
12/3/09.  Swipe survey results were observed in the STAR system for the latest operation in 
B239.   
The results of the measurement of the air filter from the continuous air monitor (CAM) from 
the latest operation in B239 were requested.  It was identified that the air filter had not been 
sent to the Radiation Measurements Lab (RML) for counting.  This was not in accordance with 
the B239 Health Physics DAP (HP-16-N) which specifies that CAM air filters are to be submitted 
to the Radiation Measurements Lab using the STAR database.  While not in accordance with the 
Health Physics DAP, the safety consequence of not submitting the air filters for counting is 
minimal in that the container for fissionable material being brought into B239 is swiped for 
 B239 IVR Form 1  
 
Page 25 of 52 
 1/15/2010  
contamination after it is removed from its packaging.  Also the passive nature of the 
nondestructive examination operations in B239 inherently does not pose a hazard of breaching 
the container enclosing the fissionable material.  The process of counting the air filter with 
equipment in the RML able to detect lower levels of contamination than seen by the CAM may 
allow for monitoring of very levels of contamination in B239; however, the possibility of having 
contamination in B239 is very low.  The low likelihood of contamination in B239 had been 
demonstrated in operational experience.  Based on the above, there appears to be very low 
safety consequence of not submitting the air filter for counting.  However, this is a deficiency 
for not following the requirements of the HP DAP in not submitting the air filters for counting, 
although the safety consequences appear minimal.   
A sample of six recent Work Permits were reviewed and found to adequately document the 
safety reviews of proposed operations/activities done by the various ES&H Team safety 
disciplines including the Lead Health Physicist.   
The key elements of the Radiation Protection Program have been demonstrated to be 
appropriately implemented in the B239 FSP and HP DAP and through a review of records and 
interviews implementation has been demonstrated. 
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Criticality Safety  
Criterion 1.1 
The B239 Criticality Safety Program is governed by LLNL ES&H Manual Document 20.6, 
Criticality Safety, and is implemented through the B239 FSP. 
Criterion 1.5 
As described above (Specific Administrative Controls section), the Criticality Safety Program is 
implemented through the B239 FSP and is initiated by the Criticality Safety Review and 
Approval form.  This program is consistent with the LLNL ES&H Manual Document 20.6 and the 
DSA/TSR. 
Criterion 1.6 
As described in the Specific Administrative Controls section, the key elements of the Criticality 
Safety Program have been appropriately implemented into the B239 FSP and through a review 
of records and interviews implementation has been demonstrated.  
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Unreviewed Safety Question Process  
Criterion 1.1 
The USQ process is implemented through the LLNL ES&H Manual Document 51.3, LLNL 
Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Procedure, Revision 8. NMTP-FMP-0600 Revision AF 
describes the NMTP administrative procedure for performing the USQ process for NMTP 
Superblock facilities.  The Superblock Work Control Manual (Ref. 21) describes the work 
permitting process. 
Criterion 1.5 
The “List of Superblock documents to which the USQ process is applicable” provides a listing of 
the various Superblock documents that are required to be under the USQ process and therefore 
must have a USQ evaluation performed against it and should enter the USQ process when 
changes to these documents are proposed.  This list was approved by the NMTP Program 
Leader and the Safety Basis Division Leader.   
The B239 DSA describes the key elements of the USQ Process to include: 
 Permits facility management to make physical changes and procedural changes and 
conduct tests and experiments without prior DOE approval as long as they do not 
explicitly or implicitly affect the facility safety basis or result in a change to a TSR 
 Ensures conditions (or potential conditions) outside the facility safety basis or TSRs are 
identified. 
These key elements are implemented through ES&H Manual Document 51.3.  For B239 
operations/activities, the USQ process is initiated through the Work Permit process and 
through NMTP-FMP-0600 Revision AF for procedure changes.  When an operation/activity is 
proposed to be performed in B239, a Work Permit form is prepared and a judgment made as to 
whether it will be processed through a USQ Categorical Exclusion or another USQ document.   
A sample of six recent Work Permits was reviewed and found to document application of the 
USQ process for review of the proposed operation/activity.  Four USQ documents (3 USQ 
Determinations and 1 USQ Screening) were reviewed and found to be performed acceptably.   
Review of the B239 USQ Determinations/Screening log reflected that baseline USQ evaluations 
were being performed for various documents (including Task Codes, ES&H Manual documents, 
ES&H Team Discipline Action Plans, NMTP Facilities Management Procedures, RHWM waste 
procedures, Criticality Safety Control Review documents, and operating procedures).   
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Formal assessment of the implementation of the USQ process in LLNL nuclear facilities was 
evident in the 2009 USQ Assessment Report in Preparation for CDNS Review (April 22, 2009).  
This assessment focused on implementation of the USQ process in LLNL nuclear facilities 
including B239 and the review of a sample of USQ documents.   
A review of USQ training was performed using LTRAIN data.  The training records in LTRAIN for 
a sample of three USQ preparer/reviewer/approvers and five preparer/reviewers were 
reviewed and all found to be current in their USQ training.  Their status was accurately reflected 
in the NMTP USQ Compliance List, October 2009 (printed on 12/16/09). 
Criterion 1.6 
The key elements of the Unreviewed Safety Questions process have been appropriately 
implemented into the B239 FSP and through a review of records and interviews 
implementation has been demonstrated. 
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Configuration Management  
Criterion 1.1 
The B239 DSA/TSR describes that the B239 Configuration Management Program is 
implemented through the following documents: 
 LLNL Graded Approach to Configuration Management (UCRL-AR-123533) 
 LLNL Configuration Management Standard (UCRL-AR-133351) 
 Nuclear Facility Maintenance Implementation Plan for the NMTP Hazard Category 3 
Facilities 
 NMTP Category 3 Nuclear Facilities and Superblock Yard/Work Control Manual. 
Criterion 1.5 
The B239 DSA/TSR describes the key elements of the Configuration Management Program to 
include: 
 Program Management 
 Design requirements (including orientation of linatrons) 
 Change Control 
 Documentation Control 
 Assessments 
It was noted that the DSA/TSR references documents that are not the most current related to 
the Configuration Management Program.  The most applicable documents that implement the 
Configuration Management Program for B239 are: 
 NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan (October 2008) 
 NMTP Superblock Work Control Manual (December 2008) 
 NMTP Maintenance Implementation Plan for Superblock Hazard Category 2 & 3 Nuclear 
Facilities (August 2008) 
The key elements of the Configuration Management Program are implemented through the 
following documents: 
 Program Management - NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan 
(October 2008) 
 Design Requirements - NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan (October 
2008) 
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 Change Control - NMTP Superblock Work Control Manual (December 2008); NMTP 
Maintenance Implementation Plan for Superblock Hazard Category 2 & 3 Nuclear 
Facilities (August 2008); USQ Process (ES&H Manual Document 51.3 and NMTP-FMP-
0600) 
 Documentation Control -  NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan 
(October 2008) 
 Assessments - NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan (October 2008) 
From a safety perspective, the principal goals of Configuration Management Program for safety 
systems are to assure that the systems’ intended safety function is maintained and to ensure 
that the facility physical configuration is maintained consistent with documentation.  This is 
done through the implementation of two processes: 1) the NMTP Work Control process which 
evaluates proposed changes to facility operations and activities and ensures consistent 
documentation; and 2) the USQ process which evaluates whether proposed changes to 
operations and activities remain within the facility safety basis.   The review of recent B239 
Work Permits confirmed that proposed changes were being appropriately controlled.  Safety 
systems that were previously considered to be safety significant are now considered Equipment 
Important to Safety (Table 5-7 of the B239 DSA) and therefore any changes to these systems 
will continue to be reviewed through NMTP Work Control and USQ processes. 
System drawings are maintained by the System Engineer and located in the facility.  The Facility 
Engineering Manager indicated that draft essential drawings and a draft System Design 
Document are being prepared.  
An assessment of the implementation of the NMTP Configuration Management Program was 
performed in November 2009.  This demonstrates implementation of assessments. 
Criterion 1.6 
The key elements of the Configuration Management Program process have been appropriately 
implemented through several documents and through a review of records and interviews 
implementation has been demonstrated. 
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Fire Protection 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a fire protection program has been established, 
implemented, and maintained to minimize any threat to public health and welfare resulting 
from a fire, and to minimize undue hazards to site personnel from a fire. 
Criterion 1.1  
The Fire Protection Program was implemented in the following documents: 
 B239 Fire Protection DAP 
 Facility Safety Plan 
 ACP-B239-01, B239 Flammable/Combustible Materials Control Procedure 
 ES&H Manual, Doc. 22.5, Fire 
Criterion 1.5 
The Fire Protection Program is implemented by the documents listed above. 
The Fire Protection Program key element, Controls on the combustible loading in Building 239, 
is implemented by the use of current procedure, ACP-B239-001, B239 Flammable/Combustible 
Materials Control Procedure, and by the Facility Safety Plan via the Fire Protection Engineer, 
Michael L. Jones. Procedure ACP-B239-001 document history lists in the Change Summary 
“Update procedure to include revised TSRs.” The Fire Protection Engineer documents the 
results using an Excel spreadsheet and communicates the results via email to the Facility 
Manager and other B239 staff as appropriate. The combustible loading is less than the TSR 
limit. 
The Fire Protection Program key element, Routine fire protection assessments conducted to 
identify fire hazards, is implemented by ACP-B239-01 and the B239 Fire Protection DAP. 
Note 1: The FHA was not cited as an implementing document in the B239 TSR 
Implementation Verification – September 2008 DSA/TSR. The FHA could be updated to 
reflect the current DOE directives in contract number DE-AC52-07NA27344, and the 
current safety basis dated September 2008. ES&H Manual Document 22.5, section 4.16, 
Fire Protection Assessment cites the FHA as a feeder document to the DSA. However, 
the FHA was not cited by the DSA. 
Note 2: FHA Section 14.1, Deficiencies, lists two items: 1. Lack of wet pipe, automatic 
sprinkler system, and 2. Lack of manual fire alarm pull stations at two exits. Each of 
these items is required by NFPA 101 – Life Safety Code. Item 2 is part of the fire 
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detection and alarm system, which is cited by the TSR via TSR section 5.4.3 referral to 
DSA Table 5-7, Equipment important to safety. DSA section 2.7.1.4, Fire Detection and 
Alarm System states the system consists of pull stations among other components, but 
the DSA does not document the deficiency regarding the pull stations. 
FHA deficiencies should be tracked and have a resolution, even if that resolution is 
simply to note that the cost constraints of an engineered solution are prohibitive. The 
Facility Manager created two ITS entries for these deficiencies. 
Criterion 1.6 
The B239 fire Protection Program has two key elements. 
ACP-B239-001, B239 Flammable/Combustible Materials Control Procedure, Scope provides a 
clear specification of the Fire Protection Program key element, Controls on the combustible 
loading in Building 239. The combustible loading limit is also a SAC. The ACP-B239-001 Scope 
provides a verbatim copy of the TSR SAC regarding combustible loading and an additional fuel 
loading control (not a TSR) and verification of the SAC, “Except for minimal quantities of 
combustible material associated with radiography of a plutonium component or item, the 
plutonium component or item shall be separated from combustible material by a 4-ft clear 
radius.” 
 
ES&H Manual Document 22.5, section 4.16, Fire Protection Assessment cites the FHA as a 
feeder document to the DSA per the Documented Safety Analysis Program as described in 
Document 51.1, “Documented Safety Analysis Program Plan,” in the ES&H Manual. Document 
51.1 states, “A key input is the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) required by DOE Order 420.1B, 
Facility Safety.” (p 7) 
 
A review of the Facility Safety Plan (FSP) Table 3-2, lists all the TSR SACs verbatim including the 
Combustible Loading Limit and the 4-ft clear radius.  
 
Note: The FSP references should be updated to reflect the revised safety basis date of 
September 2008 and the correct title of the Superblock Work Control Manual.  
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Emergency Preparedness  
Documented evidence exists to confirm that an emergency preparedness program has been 
established, implemented, and maintained for B239.  
Criterion 1.1 
The Emergency Preparedness Program is implemented in the following documents: 
 Facility Safety Plan 
 Zone 9 Self-Help Plan 
 ES&H Manual, Doc. 22.1, Emergency Preparedness and Response 
 LLNL Emergency Plan 
 
According to ES&H Manual, Doc. 22.1, “The Emergency Management Base Program at LLNL 
(”Base Program”) is intended to ensure that each occupied facility has a fundamental 
emergency action plan (emergency reporting, evacuation, assembly, and accountability) and 
that residents participate in a basic drill of the plan annually.” The Emergency Management 
“Hazardous Materials” Program at LLNL adds to the Base Program and is a formal emergency 
planning process based on the DOE requirements contained in DOE Order 151.1, 
“Comprehensive Emergency Management System. 
Note: Doc 22.1 could be updated to reflect DOE Order 151.1C. 
 
1) According to ES&H Manual, Doc. 22.1, facilities that have an EPHA shall have a facility-
specific emergency plan. The EPHA for B239 was reviewed. The May 2007 EPHA references 
the 2004 FSP and the 2003 SAR/TSR and the MAR for HEU as 25 kg. The EPHA for B239 
should be revised to reflect the current FSP and Safety Basis and the MAR for HEU as 50 kg. 
In general, there should be a mechanism established that notifies those responsible for 
maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Hazard Assessment whenever changes to the 
material at risk in a nuclear facility are authorized. This would allow for a summary 
determination as to whether a major change to emergency classification or response has 
potentially been created.  
 
Note, although the B239 facility-specific emergency plan was not cited for implementation of 
the TSR, it is out of date and in the revision process.  
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Criterion 1.5 
The Emergency Preparedness Program SMP is implemented in the following documents. 
• The B239 FSP 
• The Zone 9 Self-Help Plan 
• ES&H Manual Document 22.1, Emergency Preparedness and Response  
• The LLNL Emergency Plan 
The Alameda County Fire Department staffs LLNL Fire Station 20 located in Building 323 and has 
significant institutional capabilities including the Emergency Dispatch Center, which can deploy 
assets from the Protective Forces and Emergency Responders. 
Criterion 1.6 
The Emergency Preparedness Program has three key elements: 
• LLNL Emergency Preparedness Plan (including shelter-in-place). 
• A Zone 9 Self-Help Plan. 
• Personnel response procedures for local worker evacuation in the event of a lithium 
hydride fire. 
 
These key elements are respectively implemented by: 
 
• the LLNL Emergency Plan, 
• the Zone 9 Self-Help Plan, and 
• the B239 FSP. 
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Maintenance  
Criterion 1.1 
The B239 Maintenance Program is implemented through the NMTP Maintenance 
Implementation Plan which implements the provisions of ES&H Manual Document 52.1, LLNL 
Maintenance Management Program for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. 
Criterion 1.5 
The B239 TSR describes that the B239 Maintenance Program ensures “effective measures are 
taken so that facility SSCs are capable of performing their intended function.” 
The B239 TSR describes that the B239 Maintenance Program is implemented through the 
Nuclear Facility Maintenance Implementation Plan for NMTP Hazard Category 3 Facilities.  
However, the current revision of this document is the WCI, NMTP, Superblock Maintenance 
Implementation Plan for Superblock Hazard Category 2 & 3 Nuclear Facilities, August 2008.  The 
B239 FSP was noted to have the correct document referenced. 
In the most recent DSA/TSR, previously considered safety significant systems, structures and 
components (SSCs) are no longer safety significant.  These systems include the Daisy Chain Key-
Actuated Interlock System, Interlock Switches and Gates, Emergency Shutdown Buttons, and 
the Radiation Area Monitors and associated warning lights.  Testing continues to be performed 
at the previously established frequency and in accordance with the existing surveillance 
requirement procedures (i.e., SRP-B239-4.1.1/4.1.2/4.1.3, SRP-B239-4.2.1, and SRP-B239-4.2.2).  
These SRPs were reviewed and found to adequately test the operability of the associated SSCs 
consistent with the safety functions described in the draft System Design Description, Building 
239 System Design Description for the Daisy Chain Key-Actuated Interlock System.  A sample of 
recent tests of the Daisy Chain Key-Actuated Interlock System, Warning Light Inspection, and 
Radiation Area Monitor Test and Calibration were reviewed and found to complete and 
accurately completed. 
The B239 FSP describes in Section 4.2.1 that the Monthly Summary Report (maintained by the 
Quality Assurance Office) contains the completion of scheduled maintenance, inspection, and 
testing activities.  It was identified that this Summary Report is no longer being maintained for 
B239. Since surveillance/testing requirements will eventually be converted to PM documents, 
the need for the Summary Report is fairly low.    
Discussions with the B239 System Engineer indicated that failures of the safety systems in B239 
were rare.  It was also indicated that safety system failures would usually result in the inability 
 B239 IVR Form 1  
 
Page 36 of 52 
 1/15/2010  
of the RGDs to operate and therefore were in a fail-safe mode.    A discussion with the NMTP 
Assurance Manager indicated that there were no Corrective Action Requests for B239 related 
to maintenance.    A discussion with one of the radiographers that operates the B239 Linatrons 
indicates that there are no maintenance recommendations related to the safety aspects of the 
newest 9/5 MeV Linatron.  In addition, a contract is in place with the vendor to perform any 
required maintenance. 
Criterion 1.6 
The key elements of the B239 Maintenance Program have been appropriately implemented, 
with continued testing of B239 safety systems and through a review of records and interviews 
implementation has been demonstrated. 
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Quality Assurance 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a Quality Assurance (QA) Program has been 
established, implemented, and maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 830 , Subpart A, Quality 
Assurance Program.  
Criterion 1.1 
 Reference 9 lists the implementing documents for this TSR as: 
 ES&H Manual Document 41.1 (Ref. 12); 
 NMTP QA Program (Ref. 13); 
 Preparation, Review and Approval of NMTP Facilities Procedures, FMP-0100 (Ref. 14); 
 Tracking Procedures and Controlled Documents, FMP-0101 (Ref. 15 – Note this 
procedure expires on 1/17/10. It is being revised per Bob Swift.); 
 ECMS Document Control Procedure, FMP-0207 (Ref. 16 – Note this procedure has 
expired. It is being revised but no extension memo has been processed yet. This 
document should be formally extended while the revision process continues.) 
 Procurement/Acceptance Process for NMTP Superblock (Nuclear Materials Technology 
Program) Quality-Significant Orders, FMP-0500 (Ref. 17); 
 Recordkeeping System for NMTP Facilities, FMP-0700 (Ref. 18); 
 Calibration Program for NMTP Facilities Critical Measuring and Test Equipment, FMP-
0701 (Ref. 19); 
 WCM (NMTP-DOC-001 MMTP Category 3 Nuclear Facilities and the Superblock Yard 
Work Control Manual – This reference in the QAP has been superseded by the 
Superblock Work Control Manual, Ref 21.) 
 
Criterion 1.5 
The implementing mechanism is the NMTP Quality Assurance Program document (Reference 
13). This document describes the Quality Assurance Program for the Nuclear 
Materials Technology Program nuclear facilities, including B239. It serves as the current 
implementing interface between the institutional capability and the facility. Included is a 
description of the plans and procedures necessary to comply with and implement quality 
assurance requirements within those facilities. It was written in accordance with the 
requirements flowed down from the LLNL Quality Assurance Program (ES&H Manual Document 
41.1) and the WCI Principal Directorate Quality Assurance (QA) Plan. The NMTP QAP was 
developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 414.1C and 10CFR830 Nuclear Safety 
Management, Subpart A, “Quality Assurance”. Quality Assurance activities described in the QAP 
for NMTP facilities include management, performance and assessment. 
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Criterion 1.6  
Key elements of the Program include a graded approach in the QA review of the following: 
 Review of design and construction drawings; 
This element is assumed to be part of the design process that is described very generally 
in the NMTP QA Program (Reference 13), Section 8.2.8 Criterion 6 – Design. However, 
there is no specific mention of the review of drawings. The actual implementation 
occurs through the Change Control Process in the WCM, and is specifically called out on 
the work permit. 
 
 Inspection and acceptance testing; 
This element is mentioned briefly in Reference 13, the NMTP QAP, Section 8 – Inspection 
and Acceptance Testing, however there is no specific description of how this element is 
performed, and there is no implementing document cited. The actual implementation is 
documented on the work permit. 
 
 Document and records control; 
This element is described in Reference 13, the NMTP QAP, Section 8.1.4 Documents and 
Records. It is further described in Section 8.1.4.1, which cites the implementing 
procedure Reference 14, and in Section 8.1.4.2, which cites the implementing procedure 
Reference 15, and in Section 8.1.4.4, which cites the expired implementing procedure 
Reference 16, and in Section 8.1.4.6, which cites the implementing procedure Reference 
18.  
 
 Control of purchased items/services; 
This element is described in Reference 13, the NMTP QAP, Section 8.2.9 Criterion 7 – 
Procurement. It is further described in Section 8.2.9.1, which cites the implementing 
procedure Reference 17, and in Section 8.2.10.1, which cites the implementing 
procedure Reference 19. 
 
 Management assessments. 
This element is described in Reference 13, the NMTP QAP, Section 8.3.1 Criterion 9 – 
Management Assessment. This Section cites a further description in the NMTP Feedback 
and Improvement Plan (Reference 20.) However, the obsolete REV-1 is cited. This was 
replaced by REV-2 in August 2007.  
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Occurrence Reporting 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a program has been established, implemented, 
and maintained for occurrence reporting of events and conditions that have safety, health, or 
environmental implications.  This program is intended to ensure that both DOW and LLNL 
management are informed of all events that could (1) impact the health and safety of the 
public; (2) seriously impact the intended purpose of DOE facilities; (3) have a noticeable adverse 
effect on the environment, and (4) endanger the health and safety of the workers.  
Criterion 1.1 
Reference 9 lists the implementing documents for this TSR as: 
 Facilities Responses and Events, FMP-0400 (Ref. 22 – Note this document would have 
expired, however memo SBK 09-173 extends the expiration date to 3/18/10.) 
 Occurrence Critiques, FMP-0800 (Ref. 23) 
 ES&H Manual Document 4.3 (Ref. 24) 
 ES&H Manual Document 4.5 (Ref. 25) 
 ES&H Manual Document 4.6 (Ref. 26) 
 B239 FSP (Ref. 7) 
In addition, a sample occurrence report (Ref. 27) was reviewed as evidence of the Program 
implementation. 
Criterion 1.5 
The primary implementing mechanism is LLNL Implementation Procedure for Reporting 
Occurrences to DOE, ES&H Manual Document 4.3 (Ref. 24). This document, along with the 
accompanying Events: Notification, Analysis, and Reporting, ES&H Manual Document 4.5 (Ref. 
25) and Incident Analysis Manual, ES&H Manual Document 4.6 form a very strong and detailed 
institutional program for Occurrence Reporting. That program is administered for all of NMTP 
by a single point of contact, who provides a current implementing interface with B239.  A 
sample of documented evidence of that implementation was reviewed in Ref. 27, which deals 
with a reported TSR violation in B239. 
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Criterion 1.6 
Key elements of the Program include the following: 
 Preservations of the scene; 
This element is mentioned briefly in Ref. 24, Section 3.2 Preserve the Scene and Notify 
Management. However, there are no instructions as to how this should be done. 
Further guidance is provided in Ref. 23, Section 6.2.3 Preserve the Scene. 
 
 DOE and Management notification; 
This element is described in Ref. 24, Section 3.7 Oral Notification, and in Section 3.8 
“LLNL ORPS/NTS Reporting Form” – Initial Written Notification, and in Section 3.9 
Occurrence Initial Notification Report – E-mail Copy, and in Section 3.11 Final Occurrence 
Report.  
 
 Incident and causal analysis; 
This element is described in Ref. 24, Section 3.10 Occurrence Investigation and Causal 
Analysis. Document 4.6 (Ref. 26), ―Incident Analysis Manual in the ES&H Manual 
provides further guidance on investigations and causal analysis. 
 
 Development of corrective actions; 
This element is described in Ref. 24, Section 3.12 Corrective Actions. 
 
 Event or condition categorization. 
This element is described in Ref. 24, Section 3.5 Discovery and Categorization. 
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Accountability, Control, and Handling of Materials 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a program has been established, implemented, 
and maintained to identify and document movement, location and quantity of radioactive and 
hazardous materials within the facility. 
Criterion 1.1 
The Program for Accountability, Control, and Handling of Materials is implemented in the 
following documents: 
 Industrial Hygiene DAP 
 Facility Safety Plan 
 OSP S-003 & MM-OG-172, Transfer of Radioactive Material Among Superblock Facilities 
 ES&H Manual, Doc. 14.1, LLNL Chemical Safety Management Program 
 B239 Operations Logbook 
Criterion 1.5 
The Program for Accountability, Control, and Handling of Materials is implemented including 
the procedures and controls listed below.  
Fissionable, radioactive and hazardous materials identification, classification, verification and 
labeling, is implemented by ES&H Manual Document 21.1, Acquisition, Receipt, Transportation, 
and Tracking of Hazardous Materials. ES&H Manual Document 20.2, LLNL Radiological Safety 
Program for Radioactive Materials, implements the requirements on purchasing, accepting 
delivery, transporting, and labeling of radioactive materials. 
Fissionable, radioactive and hazardous materials packaging, handling, shipping, receiving, and 
inventory, is implemented by ES&H Manual Document 21.1, Acquisition, Receipt, 
Transportation, and Tracking of Hazardous Materials and OSP S-003. 
Fissionable, radioactive and hazardous materials certification and acceptance, is implemented 
by ES&H Manual Document 21.1, Acquisition, Receipt, Transportation, and Tracking of 
Hazardous Materials. 
Items containing nonresident SNM (highly enriched uranium) shall be singly contained in a 
welded metal barrier or doubly contained with at least one barrier being a sealed, metal 
container is implemented by the FSP (p 3-13). 
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The total time in any given year that plutonium items (not including TRU waste) are present in 
Building 239 is limited to 576 hours (~24 days) is implemented by a logbook maintained in the 
B239 operations room and by the FSP (pp 3-6 and B-1). 
Except for when squibs are an integral part of an item containing plutonium, high explosives 
and plutonium are not to be handled in the same area (within the same room) of the building is 
implemented by the FSP (p 3-21). 
SNM items brought into the facility are to be surveyed for contamination is implemented by the 
FSP (p 3-13). 
Items containing nonresident hazardous material are to be confined within a sealed barrier or 
handled using protective clothing to avoid unwanted reaction or exposure. 
When loading and unloading radioactive or hazardous material, the vehicle ignition shall be 
turned off and the parking brake set is implemented by the FSP (p 3-13). 
Prior to transfer to Building 239, waste drums containing SNM shall be inspected for evidence 
of container damage or overpressurization and for compliance with DOT specification and 
applicable DOE requirements. Acceptance by the Building 239 Facility Manager, Facility Point of 
contact, or designee of the appropriate Transportation Safety Document (TSD) paperwork 
satisfies this requirement. 
Criterion 1.6 
The TSR does not specify any key elements different from the procedures and controls listed 
and addressed in Criterion 1.5 above. 
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Hazardous Material Safety 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a hazardous material safety program has been 
established, implemented, and maintained to ensure that exposure of employees, 
subcontractors, visitors, and members of the general public to hazardous materials is 
controlled. 
Criterion 1.1 
The Hazardous Material Safety program is implemented by the following documents: 
 Industrial Hygiene (aka the Chem/Bio) DAP 
 Facility Safety Plan 
 ES&H Manual, Doc. 10.2 
 ChemTrack web site 
Criterion 1.5 
The Hazardous Material Safety program is implemented by the following documents: 
 Industrial Hygiene (aka the Chem/Bio) DAP 
 Facility Safety Plan 
 ES&H Manual, Doc. 10.2 
 ChemTrack web site 
 The B239 Training Manual and  
 LTRAIN 
Criterion 1.6 
The Hazardous Material Safety Program has three key elements.  
• Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs). 
• Personnel training and qualification. 
• Chemical storage and waste disposal procedures. 
The Hazardous Material Safety Program key element, MSDSs, is implemented via ES&H Manual, 
Doc. 10.2, Section 3 and the ChemTrack web site.  
The H&S Team 1 member, Jim Boyer, provided a copy of DowTherm MSDS via email as an 
example. The DowTherm material was observed during the IVR facility walkthrough. 
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The Hazardous Material Safety Program key element, personnel training and qualification is 
implemented via the FSP, the B239 Training Manual and LTRAIN. 
The Hazardous Material Safety Program key element, chemical storage and waste disposal 
procedures are implemented via the Industrial Hygiene DAP. 
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Procedures and Plans 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a program has been established to prepare 
procedures and plans that provide direction to ensure that the facility is operated within its 
design basis and supports safe operation of the facility. 
Criterion 1.1 
Reference 9 lists the implementing documents for this administrative control as: 
 B239 FSP (Ref. 7) 
 WCM (Ref. 21) 
 QAP (Ref.13) 
 CMP (Ref. 36 and 37) 
 SRPs (Ref. 30 and 31) 
 MIP (Ref. 32) 
 FMP-0600 (Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Process, Ref. 33) 
 ES&H Manual Document 3.3 (Facility Safety Plans and Integration Work Sheets with 
Safety Plans, Ref. 34) 
 FMP-0102 (OSP Development and Implementation Guide, Ref. 35) 
Criterion 1.5 
B239 relies on generic Superblock documents as the implementing mechanism for the 
development of procedures and plans. In particular, the NMTP Quality Assurance Plan (Ref. 13) 
and the NMTP Nuclear Facility Configuration Management Plan (Ref. 36) provide the 
fundamental implementing mechanisms. 
Criterion 1.6 
There are no key elements for the Procedures and Plans administrative control. 
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Minimum Staffing 
Documented evidence exists to confirm that a program has been established, implemented, 
and maintained for to assure at least a minimum shift complement of staff is always available. 
The generic Minimum support staffing requirements that appear as Table 5-1 in the TSR (Ref. 2) 
are repeated exactly in the FSP (Ref. 7) as Table 3-3. For specific operations, further staffing 
requirements beyond these minimums are often promulgated through the work control 
process, based on the hazards associated with the operation. 
Criterion 1.1 
The generic Minimum Support Staffing Requirements that appear as Table 5-1 in the TSR (Ref.2) 
are repeated exactly in the FSP (Ref. 7) as Table 3-3. No further flow-down of these 
requirements is needed.  
Criterion 1.5 
The Minimum Staffing Requirements are simple, and no documented implementing mechanism 
is needed beyond the citation in the FSP noted above. In the unlikely event that the Facility 
Manager or Designee is not onsite during working hours, it is the Facility Manager’s 
responsibility to ensure that no operations with radioactive materials are authorized. 
Criterion 1.6 
There are no key elements for the Minimum Staffing Program. 
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Recordkeeping  
Criterion 1.1 
Recordkeeping is implemented through NMTP-FMP-0700, Recordkeeping System for NMTP 
Facilities.   
Criterion 1.5 
The key elements for Recordkeeping described in the B239 TSR are: 
 Records and logs of operations 
 Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repairs, and 
replacement of principal equipment items related to: Safety Significant SSCs 
 All reportable events/occurrences 
 Records of surveillance activities, inspections, and calibrations required by TSRs 
 Record of changes made to Surveillance Requirement Procedures 
 Records and drawing changes reflecting facility design modifications made to systems 
and equipment described in the DSA 
 Records of onsite radiation exposure for all individuals working in the facility 
 Records of training and qualifications for Building 239 staff 
 Records of USQ documents 
NMTP-FMP-0700 describes the various recordkeeping systems that maintain the records 
related to the above key elements. 
Through the review of the various elements of this IVR, records were reviewed and verified to 
exist, such as operations logbook, surveillance/testing records, Surveillance Requirement 
Procedure revision logs, Work Permits, monthly radiation dose summaries to appropriate 
management, training records in LTRAIN, and USQ documents.  The IVR confirmed that 
appropriate records are being maintained and are readily retrievable. 
Criterion 1.6 
The key elements of the Recordkeeping program have been appropriately implemented into 
NMTP-FMP-0700 through a review of records and interviews implementation has been 
demonstrated.  
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Functional Area: Objective: Date: Objective Met: 
Training 2 1/15/10 
 
     Yes 
 
     No 
Objective 2 
Verify that facility personnel have been trained on implemented TSR controls and 
requirements. 
Criterion 2.1 
Validate that the Training and Qualification program has established, documented, and 
implemented requirements for the facility manager, operations personnel and operations 
support (ES&H, criticality and safety basis) to be trained on the TSRs and any changes. 
Review Approach: review facility-specific training manuals. Describe the aspects of the training 
program in place that establishes, documents, and implements safety basis-related training 
requirements. Validate that these requirements cover the relevant subject areas. 
How is completion of this training recorded and verified? What controls are implemented to 
ensure only trained workers are permitted to conduct activities in the facility? 
How are support service personnel screened for required safety basis training?  
Criterion 2.2 
Validate that training has been performed and documented to the latest revision of the B239 
safety basis documents and implementing work instructions. 
Review Approach: Review the training program records against personnel authorized to work 
in and support the facility. 
Criterion 2.3 
Verify that facility personnel responsible for implementing a SAC have been fully trained and 
qualified on SACs in general and specifically on the SAC being implemented. 
Review Approach: Interview several operations and support service personnel on TSRs. 
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Documents and Records Reviewed 
These are included in the listing for the Controls Functional Area. 
Interviews Conducted 
These are included in the listing for the Controls Functional Area. 
Evolutions Performed and Observed 
These are included in the listing for the Controls Functional Area. 
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Discussion of Results 
 
Criterion 2.1 
This criterion has been met.   The Training and Qualification program has established, 
documented, and implemented requirements for the facility manager, operations personnel 
and operations support (ES&H, criticality and safety basis) to be trained on the TSRs and any 
changes. 
Details of Review 
B239 worker training and qualification requirements are prepared and maintained in 
accordance with the B239 TIM (Ref. 89 and 90) and the B239 Training Manual (Ref. 58).  The 
training manual contains a matrix identifying training requirements for each worker position 
and class of visitor.  This matrix has been translated into a checklist that must be completed for 
each individual before facility access and/or permission to work a task is granted.   B239 has no 
positions requiring Certification per DOE 5480.20A requirements; if a certified fissile material 
handler is required for an operation the work is performed by one from B332 who has also 
completed the necessary B239 training.     
NOTE:  The checklist used for access/qualification, while derived from the training manual 
matrix and carefully reviewed and approved by management, is not itself a configuration-
managed document.  It may be worthwhile to place this under formal CM, perhaps by 
incorporating it into the B239 Training Manual. 
Per the Training Manual (Ref. 58), the Training Manager is responsible for maintaining up to 
date training records for B239 personnel.   Training requirements, both due and completion 
dates, are tracked in LTRAIN.   
For the just implemented DSA/TSR annual update (Ref’s. 1, 2 and 3), training materials specific 
to the update (Ref. 65) were reviewed against the updated DSA/TSRs and FSP (Ref. 7) and ACP-
B239-001, (Ref. 10)  to verify that changes promulgated in the update were appropriately 
covered in the materials.  Every significant change in the amendment was properly reflected in 
the training materials (non-essential, e.g., editorial, changes were not covered in the training, 
other than the trainer noted in passing during the class that there were some). 
The Facility Manager, Deputy Facility Manager, NMTP Training Manager and NMTP Trainer 
were interviewed.  They all demonstrated an understanding of training requirements and the 
flow down of DSA/TSR requirements to the training.   
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Criterion 2.2 
This criterion has been met.  Training has been performed and documented to the latest 
revision of the B239 safety basis documents and implementing work instructions. 
Details of Review 
Training (using materials as discussed in criterion 2.1) completion is documented by class sign-
in sheets (Ref. 91) and required reading completion signature sheets (Ref. 87).   Core personnel 
received in-class training on December 9, 2009, and completed the required reading (ACP-
B239-001) the same day.  It was noted during this review that some of the core personnel had 
not attended the training; when questioned, the FM indicated that he was aware of the status 
and that the individuals would not be allowed to perform TSR related work in the facility until 
the training was completed.   Non-core personnel, e.g., safety analysts and other support 
personnel, received in-class training on December 16, 2009.  As these people do not perform 
day-to-day work in the facility, the ACP reading was not required.  (Update – a third class 
session, comprising both core and non-core personnel, was held on January 5, 2010. The 
session included both in-class and ACP required reading.) 
Interviews 
In addition to the management interviews noted in criterion 2.1, interviews were held with 
selected workers (a material handler and an RGD operator).  Both showed that they had a good 
understanding and retention of the training material.  During the interviews, both were given 
hypothetical “off-normal” event scenarios related to TSRs (e.g., leaking/contaminated item, 
interlock failure, fire loading) and asked to discuss what their responses would be.   In both 
cases they showed an understanding of the meaning and intent of the TSR.  Also, the RGD 
operator “walked” the interviewer through a sweep and interlock system set routine, and the 
material handler “walked” the interviewer through the basics of material movement and 
interactions with the RGD operators.  These activities as described were consistent with the 
TSRs. 
Criterion 2.3 
This criterion has been met.  However, not all facility personnel responsible for implementing a 
SAC are current  in training relevant for safety management program implementation (e.g., 
work control). This has potential implications for SAC implementation, but on balance 
personnel are aware of SAC requirements. 
Details of Review 
LTRAIN records were reviewed for three core B239 workers whose work relates to TSRs/SACs, 
each in a different role, for a reasonably representative cross-section of the facility workforce.  
Two of those reviewed have completed all necessary training and qualification requirements to 
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be qualified to properly implement SACs in general and specifically the SACs being 
implemented in this annual update.  The third worker was missing three classes, SB3008, 
SB3205-P, and SB3205-W. SB3008 is a training requirements briefing, which may not be critical 
for TSR related work in the facility. SB3205-P and SB3205-W are for the NMTP work control 
manual, and are considered relevant as the facility work control process for SAC 
implementation relies on NMTP work control manual processes.  All three personnel have, 
however, completed the recent training related to the DSA/TSR annual update described 
above. 
In addition, there is no documentation defining all the core personnel for B239 and their safety 
basis-related training requirements. That makes it difficult to assess whether all core personnel 
are properly trained for TSR implementation. 
FINDING of DEFICIENCY:  At least one B239 worker in a significant position has not completed 
all necessary training. The minimum core personnel needed to declare implementation should 
be defined. The minimum training requirements for those personnel, including safety basis and 
relevant safety management program training, should be defined. 
 
